

Propositional and Predicate Logic - III

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Horn-SAT

- A *unit clause* is a clause containing a single literal,
- a *Horn clause* is a clause containing **at most** one positive literal,

$$\neg p_1 \vee \dots \vee \neg p_n \vee q \sim (p_1 \wedge \dots \wedge p_n) \rightarrow q$$

- a *Horn formula* is a conjunction of Horn clauses,
- *Horn-SAT* is the problem of satisfiability of a given Horn formula.

Algorithm

- (1) if φ contains a pair of unit clauses l and \bar{l} , then it is not satisfiable,
- (2) if φ contains a unit clause l , then assign 1 to l , remove all clauses containing l , remove \bar{l} from all clauses, and repeat from the start,
- (3) if φ does not contain a unit clause, then it is satisfied by assigning 0 to all remaining propositional variables.

Step (2) is called *unit propagation*.

Unit propagation

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 (\neg p \vee q) \wedge (\neg p \vee \neg q \vee r) \wedge (\neg r \vee \neg s) \wedge (\neg t \vee s) \wedge s & v(s) = 1 \\
 (\neg p \vee q) \wedge (\neg p \vee \neg q \vee r) \wedge \neg r & v(\neg r) = 1 \\
 (\neg p \vee q) \wedge (\neg p \vee \neg q) & v(p) = v(q) = v(t) = 0
 \end{array}$$

Observation Let φ^l be the proposition obtained from φ by *unit propagation*. Then φ^l is satisfiable if and only if φ is satisfiable.

Corollary The algorithm is correct (it solves Horn-SAT).

Proof The correctness in Step (1) is obvious, in Step (2) it follows from the observation, in Step (3) it follows from the *Horn form* since every remaining clause contains at least one negative literal.

Note A direct implementation requires quadratic time, but with an appropriate representation in memory, one can achieve linear time (w.r.t. the length of φ).

Theory

Informally, a theory is a description of “world” to which we restrict ourselves.

- A propositional *theory* over the language \mathbb{P} is any set T of propositions from $\mathcal{V}\mathbb{F}_{\mathbb{P}}$. We say that propositions of T are *axioms* of the theory T .
- A *model of theory* T over \mathbb{P} is an assignment $v \in M(\mathbb{P})$ (i.e. a model of the language) in which all axioms of T are true, denoted by $v \models T$.
- A *class of models* of T is $M^{\mathbb{P}}(T) = \{v \in M(\mathbb{P}) \mid v \models \varphi \text{ for every } \varphi \in T\}$.

For example, for $T = \{p, \neg p \vee \neg q, q \rightarrow r\}$ over $\mathbb{P} = \{p, q, r\}$ we have

$$M^{\mathbb{P}}(T) = \{(1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1)\}$$

- If a theory is finite, it can be replaced by a *conjunction* of its axioms.
- We write $M(T, \varphi)$ as a shortcut for $M(T \cup \{\varphi\})$.

Semantics with respect to a theory

Semantic notions can be defined with respect to a theory, more precisely, with respect to its models. Let T be a theory over \mathbb{P} . A proposition φ over \mathbb{P} is

- *valid in T (true in T)* if it is true in every model of T , denoted by $T \models \varphi$. We also say that φ is a (semantic) *consequence* of T .
- *unsatisfiable (contradictory) in T (inconsistent with T)* if it is false in every model of T ,
- *independent (or contingency) in T* if it is true in some model of T and false in some other,
- *satisfiable in T (consistent with T)* if it is true in some model of T .

Propositions φ and ψ are *equivalent in T (T -equivalent)*, denoted by $\varphi \sim_T \psi$, if for every model v of T , $v \models \varphi$ if and only if $v \models \psi$.

Note If all axioms of a theory T are valid (tautologies), e.g for $T = \emptyset$, then all notions with respect to T correspond to the same notions in (pure) logic.

Consequence of a theory

The *consequence* of a theory T over \mathbb{P} is the set $\theta^{\mathbb{P}}(T)$ of all propositions that are valid in T , i.e.

$$\theta^{\mathbb{P}}(T) = \{\varphi \in \mathbf{VF}_{\mathbb{P}} \mid T \models \varphi\}.$$

Proposition For every theories $T \subseteq T'$ and propositions $\varphi, \varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n$ over \mathbb{P} ,

- (1) $T \subseteq \theta^{\mathbb{P}}(T) = \theta^{\mathbb{P}}(\theta^{\mathbb{P}}(T)) \subseteq \theta^{\mathbb{P}}(T')$,
- (2) $\varphi \in \theta^{\mathbb{P}}(\{\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n\})$ if and only if $\models (\varphi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \varphi_n) \rightarrow \varphi$.

Proof By definition, $T \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow M(T) \subseteq M(\varphi)$ and $M(T') \subseteq M(T) = M(\theta(T))$.

- (1) $\varphi \in T \Rightarrow M(T) \subseteq M(\varphi) \Leftrightarrow T \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow \varphi \in \theta(T) \Leftrightarrow$
 $M(\theta(T)) \subseteq M(\varphi) \Leftrightarrow \theta(T) \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow \varphi \in \theta(\theta(T)) \Rightarrow$
 $M(T') \subseteq M(\varphi) \Leftrightarrow T' \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow \varphi \in \theta(T')$

Part (2) follows similarly from $M(\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n) = M(\varphi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \varphi_n)$ and $\models \psi \rightarrow \varphi$ if and only if $M(\psi) \subseteq M(\varphi)$. \square

Properties of theories

A propositional theory T over \mathbb{P} is (*semantically*)

- *inconsistent* (*unsatisfiable*) if $T \models \perp$, otherwise is *consistent* (*satisfiable*),
- *complete* if it is consistent, and $T \models \varphi$ or $T \models \neg\varphi$ for every $\varphi \in \text{VF}_{\mathbb{P}}$,
i.e. no proposition over \mathbb{P} is independent in T ,
- *extension* of a theory T' over \mathbb{P}' if $\mathbb{P}' \subseteq \mathbb{P}$ and $\theta^{\mathbb{P}'}(T') \subseteq \theta^{\mathbb{P}}(T)$;
we say that an extension T of a theory T' is *simple* if $\mathbb{P} = \mathbb{P}'$; and
conservative if $\theta^{\mathbb{P}'}(T') = \theta^{\mathbb{P}}(T) \cap \text{VF}_{\mathbb{P}'}$,
- *equivalent* with a theory T' if T is an extension of T' and vice-versa,

Observation Let T and T' be theories over \mathbb{P} . Then T is (semantically)

- (1) consistent if and only if it has a model,
- (2) complete if and only if it has a single model,
- (3) extension of T' if and only if $M^{\mathbb{P}}(T) \subseteq M^{\mathbb{P}}(T')$,
- (4) equivalent with T' if and only if $M^{\mathbb{P}}(T) = M^{\mathbb{P}}(T')$.

Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra

Let T be a consistent theory over \mathbb{P} . On the quotient set $\mathbf{VF}_{\mathbb{P}}/\sim_T$ we define operations $\neg, \wedge, \vee, \perp, \top$ (correctly) by use of representatives, e.g

$$[\varphi]_{\sim_T} \wedge [\psi]_{\sim_T} = [\varphi \wedge \psi]_{\sim_T}$$

Then $AV^{\mathbb{P}}(T) = \langle \mathbf{VF}_{\mathbb{P}}/\sim_T, \neg, \wedge, \vee, \perp, \top \rangle$ is *Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra* for T .

Since $\varphi \sim_T \psi \Leftrightarrow M(T, \varphi) = M(T, \psi)$, it follows that $h([\varphi]_{\sim_T}) = M(T, \varphi)$ is a (well-defined) injective function $h: \mathbf{VF}_{\mathbb{P}}/\sim_T \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(M(T))$ and

$$h(\neg[\varphi]_{\sim_T}) = M(T) \setminus M(T, \varphi)$$

$$h([\varphi]_{\sim_T} \wedge [\psi]_{\sim_T}) = M(T, \varphi) \cap M(T, \psi)$$

$$h([\varphi]_{\sim_T} \vee [\psi]_{\sim_T}) = M(T, \varphi) \cup M(T, \psi)$$

$$h([\perp]_{\sim_T}) = \emptyset, \quad h([\top]_{\sim_T}) = M(T)$$

Moreover, h is *surjective* if $M(T)$ is *finite*.

Corollary If T is a consistent theory over a finite \mathbb{P} , then $AV^{\mathbb{P}}(T)$ is a **Boolean algebra** isomorphic via h to the (finite) **algebra of sets** $\mathcal{P}(M(T))$.

Analysis of theories over finite languages

Let T be a consistent theory over \mathbb{P} where $|\mathbb{P}| = n \in \mathbb{N}^+$ and $m = |M^{\mathbb{P}}(T)|$.

Then the number of (mutually) **nonequivalent**

- propositions (or theories) over \mathbb{P} is 2^{2^n} ,
- propositions over \mathbb{P} that are valid (contradictory) in T is $2^{2^n - m}$,
- propositions over \mathbb{P} that are independent in T is $2^{2^n} - 2 \cdot 2^{2^n - m}$,
- simple extensions of T is 2^m , out of which **1** is inconsistent,
- complete simple extensions of T is m .

And the number of (mutually) **T -nonequivalent**

- propositions over \mathbb{P} is 2^m ,
- propositions over \mathbb{P} that are valid (contradictory) (in T) is **1**,
- propositions over \mathbb{P} that are independent (in T) is $2^m - 2$.

Proof By the bijection of $\text{VF}_{\mathbb{P}} / \sim$ resp. $\text{VF}_{\mathbb{P}} / \sim_T$ with $\mathcal{P}(M(\mathbb{P}))$ resp. $\mathcal{P}(M^{\mathbb{P}}(T))$ it suffices to determine the number of appropriate subsets of models. \square

Formal proof systems

We formalize precisely the notion of proof as a *syntactical* procedure.

In (*standard*) formal proof systems,

- a proof is a *finite* object, it can be built from axioms of a given *theory*,
- $T \vdash \varphi$ denotes that φ is *provable* from a theory T ,
- if a formula has a proof, it can be found “*algorithmically*”,
(If T is “*given algorithmically*”.)

We usually require that a formal proof system is

- *sound*, i.e. every formula provable from a theory T is also valid in T ,
- *complete*, i.e. every formula valid in T is also provable from T .

Examples of formal proof systems (calculi): *tableaux methods*, *Hilbert systems*, *Gentzen systems*, *natural deduction systems*.



Tableau method - introduction

We assume that the language is fixed and **at most countable**, i.e. the set of propositional letters \mathbb{P} is at most countable. Then every **theory** over \mathbb{P} is **at most countable**.

Main features of the tableau method (*informally*)

- a **tableau** for a formula φ is a binary labeled tree representing systematic search for **counterexample** to φ , i.e. a model of theory in which φ is false,
- a formula is **proved** if every branch in tableau 'fails', i.e. counterexample was not found. In this case the (systematic) tableau will be **finite**,
- if a counterexample exists, there will be a branch in a (finished) tableau that provides us with this counterexample, but this branch can be **infinite**.

Introductory examples



Explanation to examples

Nodes in tableaux are labeled by *entries*. An entry is a formula with a *sign* T / F representing an assumption that the formula is **true** / **false** in some model. If this assumption is correct, then it is correct also for all the entries in some branch below that came from this entry.

In both examples we have **finished** (systematic) tableaux from no axioms.

- On the left, there is a *tableau proof* for $((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p$. All branches “failed”, denoted by \otimes , as each contains a pair $T\varphi, F\varphi$ for some φ (*counterexample was not found*). Thus the formula is provable, written by

$$\vdash ((p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p$$

- On the right, there is a (finished) tableau for $(\neg q \vee p) \rightarrow p$. The left branch did not “fail” and is **finished** (all its entries were considered) (*it provides us with a counterexample* $v(p) = v(q) = 0$).